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IV. EVALUATION OF SOl\-lE ARGUMENTS AGAINST GOVE&"I/MENT INTERVENTION 
TO INFLUENCE TERR1TOR1AL POPULATION DISTR1BUTION 
Walter B. Stohr* 
.-\rguments against government intervention to in-
fluence territorial population distribution arc raised 
either from a practical/political poinc of view or from a 
theoretical/consistency point of view. In the present 
paper they are discussed in this sequence although 
they are, of course, sometimes mutually interrelated, 
as will be seen . Furthermore, this discussion distin-
guishes between arguments concerning what may be 
called "adaptive" government intervention. as distinct 
from "normative" government intervention. The latter 
policy is divided into: la) ••facilitating normative" ; and 
(b) ··restricting normative" government intervention. 
This organization appears justified inasmuch as both 
the practical/political and the theoretical arguments 
appear to differ with regard to these types of interven-
tion. 
A. Two TYPES OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION TO 
INFLUENCE TERRITORIAL POPU L.4-TION DISTRIBU· 
TION : ADAPTIVE AND NORMATIVE INTERVENTION 
Policies to influence the cerritoriaJ dis1ribu1ion of 
population are usually thought of primarily in terms of 
interventions to bring the distribution of population in 
accord with the spatial distribution of economic op-
portunities. Although these types of policies are dealt 
with explicicly in the latter part of this paper, the topic 
should first be discussed within a broader context. 
Changes in the territorial distribution of population 
usually take place in connection with functional 
changes in physical. social, political, technological or 
economic conditions. Such changes may either occur 
as a consequence of the functional changes or as an aid 
to facilitate them. 
In the first case. changes in the territorial distribu-
tion of population are a consequence or an accom-
panying phenomenon of the functional processes 
mentioned: the distribution of the population will 
adapt to changes in climate or to the exhaustion of 
natural resources, to the emergence of new forms of 
social organization and ownership, to the acquisition 
or loss of territory as a result of war or treaty; or to 
new economic opportunities offered by the construc-
tion of railways or freeways , through industrialization, 
auwmation etc. Such adaptation can occur without 
government intervention through the spontaneous 
• Professor and Director. lnterdisc,plinary Institute for Urban ,nd 
Regional Studies, University of Economic,, Vienna. Austria . 
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reaction of households and enterprises to these 
functional processes. On the other hand, they can be 
co-ordinated by governmental institutions at different 
spatial scales. e.g., at local. regional, national or 
supranational levels: by local or regional plans. na-
tional settlement policies. international migration 
policies etc. The latter policies are here termed 
"adaptive" government intervention to influence ter-
ritorial population distribution, because they represent 
at1empts to adapt the population distribution 10 the 
requirements of other societal processes. 
However, government intervention in the territorial 
distribution of population can also take place in order 
to facilitate certain ocher societal objectives: Gov-
ernments may try 10 settle new areas in order to 
exploit their mineral or agricultural resources: they 
may at1empt to change existing settlement patterns in 
order to facilitate new forms of community organiza-
tion. to change existing power structures or to utilize 
expected economic advantages of economic growth 
centres or of a more intensive utilization of rural re-
sources. This type is termed "normative" government 
intervention to influence territorial population distri-
bution. Whereas adaptive government intervention is a 
consequence of functional societal processes, norma-
tive intervention is a prerequisite or a facilitating con-
dition of those processes. In the first case, functional 
societal change determines territorial change; in the 
second, territorial change guides functional societal 
change.' 
On the whole, few arguments are raised against 
adaptive government intervention to influence territo-
rial population distribution, but many arguments are 
given against normative intervention, both from a 
practical/political point of view and from a theoreti-
cal/consistency standpoint. Such arguments are levied 
against intervention for various reasons: 
(a) It restricts the freedom of the individual in 
moving and choosing a residential and working loca-
tion of his or her own free will. that is, in .. voting with 
one's feet". 2 In this connection, the question must be 
raised whether and in which cases government inter-
vention actually restricts this freedom , or in which 
cases this freedom is really only restored by such 
1 John Friedmann and Clyde Weaver. Turiror, and Fur,crion: Tht 
Evolution of Regional Planmrrf •.London. Edward Arnold. 1978). 
' Charles M. Ticbout . • A pure 1hcory of local expenditures" , 
Journal of Political economy, vol. 64 , No . 5 (October 1956). pp. 
41&-124 . 
,ntc:rvencion in the face of other (funccional) societal 
rrocesse-.g ., industrialization or changes in terms 
oJ( 1rade-which themselves curtail individual free-
..:um. This point is the focus not only of the practical/ 
f")litical but of the theoretical/consistency arguments; 
lb) It disturbs an automatic equilibrium mechanism 
"'hich would otherwise induce persons to move to 
locations where both their individual welfare and 
.,~regale national efficiency would be maximized . 
This argument has been raised by neo-classical 
economises and by policical liberals: it is analysed in 
,c:ccion C mainly from a theoretical/consistency point 
of view; 
(c) It primarily serves the interests of the ruling 
economic and political strata by making abundant and 
1herefore cheap labour available in locations that best 
suit the interests of those strata; this practical/political 
argument has only very recently been levied overtly: 
(d) It , in practice. is ineffective because of the per-
vasive influence of overall economic and political 
structures which relegate government intervention to 
influence territorial population distribution to a mere 
superficial action and an attempt to cure symptoms 
rather than addressing their underlying causes; 
k l It is ineffective because of the complexity of 
behavioural and deterministic factors governing 
population distribution which makes any intervention, 
short of complete government control over all inter-
actions between individuals and enterprises , useless. 
In order to deal with these questions more sys-
tematically, the types of interventions are described 
below and are illustrated in figure II. 
The types of government intervention to influence 
territorial population distribution and their objectives 
are: 
(a) Adaptive intervention: the objective is to adapt 
population distribution to the consequences of 
functional societal change, e.g. , of industrialization, 
modernization. spontaneous growth centres: 
(b) Normative intervention: the objective is to use 
government intervention as an instrument to influence 
the rate and direction of functional societal change; 
(c) Faciliraring normative intervention: the objec-
tive is to facilitate specific objectives of overall 
societal change; 
(d) Restricring normative intervention: the objec-
tive is to control societal change to reduce disruptive 
effects. 
Figure 11. Type, of govrrnrMnt lntrnmtion 10 inllueoa trrritorul 
population distribution /GUTPD) 
" Adaptive"GIITPO ------~ 
FUNCTIONAL SOCIETAL 
CHANGE 
TERRITORIAL POPVLA TION 
DISTRIBUTION 
I ..__" Facilitating7 L_ Normative" GIITPO 
' 'Rutrictinq 
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B. PRACTICAL/POLITICAL ARGUMENTS CONCERNING 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION TO INFLUEN C E 
TERRITORIAL POPULATION DISTRIBUTION 
Practical/political arguments against government 
intervention to influence territorial population distri-
bution are levied mainly because of their socio-politi-
cal consequences. On the who le. some of these 
arguments seem stronger than the theoretical 
arguments which usually occupy the foreground of 
public discussion . 
Arguments concerning aJaprive intervention 
Adaptive government intervention to influence ter-
ritorial population distribution usually takes place to 
ameliorate the effects of functional changes. If the se 
changes occur in physical conditions and are abrupt , 
such as earthquakes or droughts, there is scarcely an 
argument against government intervention as it is ob-
viously necessary physically and economically to 
protect the population concerned. The Government 
will usually even be called on to evacuate populacion 
to safer areas or to resettle it in more appropriate 
territorial patterns. 
With respect to adaptations to long-term cha nges in 
the physical environment, such as climatic changes , 
desertification, periodic droughts or evacuation of pe-
riodic flood or earthquake areas, government inter-
vention is usually also accepted or even required . The 
difficulties lie rather in the scientific capability of a 
reliable long-term projection of such danger areas. on 
the one hand; and in the actual political capacity for 
implementing such long-term adaptive pol icies in view 
of pressing bottle-necks of land and other resources in 
the short term, on the other. In few cases has it actu-
ally been possible to keep potential earthquake or 
flood areas free from settlement in developing coun-
tries, particularly if there is a great demand by the 
population (usually poor) for cheap land . 
If functional change takes place in socio-economic 
structures, adaptive government intervention to 
influence territorial population distribution pos-
sibly finds more differentiated but still widely positive 
reaction. There is usually little objection. at least by 
the politically vocal population groups, against gov-
ernment intervention to influence population redi s-
tribution to facilitate the labour supply for rapidly 
growing metropolitan agglomerations or for other 
spontaneous growth centres,3 nor to accompany the 
transition from traditional (tribal, Gemeinschafr type) 
forms of social organization with a decentralized ter-
ritorial pattern to ··modem" (functional, Geselischafi 
type) forms with more centralized territorial patterns. 
Only recently have such policies been more vigorously 
protested by formerly non-vocal groups as they have 
' William Alonso and Elliou Medrich. - s ponianeous growth cen-
rcrs in twencicch--century American urbanization" , in ,',Jiles M. Han• 
sen. ed .. Growth Cem~rJ in Regional Economic Development ( New 
York and London. Free Press, 1972). pp . 229-264. 
become sufficiently mobilized either to oppose abrupt 
functional changes, such :is rapid industrialization or 
modernization (e .g. the re-Muslimization wave in 
Iran I. or to oppose the disruption of their natural or 
social environments as a consequence of functional 
changes (resistance against drastic resettlement 
rolicies in Democratic Kampuchea, Narita airport 
resisrance in Japan etc.).' 
One key question in this connection is whether such 
overall functional cha nges as rapid industrialization or 
modernization are to be given absolute priority over 
changes in the concrete territorial /natur:il. social) en-
vironments of local communities. Government inter-
vention to influence territorial population distribution 
then serves at best to mitigate the se consequences. 
The alternative would be to give territorial living con-
ditions priority and to adjust the rate of functional 
change tindustrialization. moderniz:ition etc .) to rheir 
requirements . 5 
A second key question is the extent to which rhe 
broad mass of the population, including those with 
poor access to social power . can bring pressure to bear 
upon government policy-makers. Usually , only a small 
minority of the population benefits. particularly in the 
initial phases. from large- scale functional changes. 
such as rapid industrialization and modernization . The 
satisfaction of the basic needs of the large majority of 
the population hardly improves because it is deter-
mined mainly by their immediate territorially defined 
environment which they can do little to expand, short 
of fleeing by migration. 
Arguments levied against adaptive government in-
terventions or rather against their underlying causes 
rherefore depend to a great degree upon whether their 
results are considered from the point of view of a small 
minority benefiting immediately from rapid functional 
change or from the point of view of the remaining large 
majority of the population. 
Arguments concerning normarive iniervention 
:'formative government intervention to influence 
territorial population distribution may serve: (a) to 
facilitate desired changes in physical. political or eco-
nomic structures; or lb) to restrict such changes be-
c:iuse of their negative effects upon the territorial liv-
ing conditions of concrete local or regional com-
munities . 
ln the first case. such normative intervention will . 
' A rypical example of an .. Jdaptive- government intervention to 
rnfiucnce rcrrirorial population distnbution is described in Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development . . Wigrarion, 
Grow1/r and Deve/opm,n1 . report of an Expert Group chaired by 
Professor Charles P. Kindlcbcrgcr rP:uis, 1979) . Som<e negative e,-
;,cricnces of countncs 1n the Organisation for Economic Co-
•Jpcraoon a.nd Development arc menuoned in sccnon E of the pres-
ent paper. 
' Walter S1ohr and F. Tod!ling, - s patial equity-wmc antitheses 
to current regional development doctrine .... Papers of thl! Rtfl1onal 
Science -~ssocianon. vol. XXXVlll. 1978), rcpnnt<ed ,n modified 
form in Hendrik Folmer and Jan Oosterhaven. eds .. Spaual ln-
equa / i11es and R,g,ona/ o,.,,Jopmen1 •.L~iden . Nijhoff. 1978). 
for example, attempt to redistribute population to 
facilitate the incorporation of new resource frontiers 
(Brazil. Canada, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics); 
to support migration to locations of new social organi-
zations (e.g . , the formation of Ujamaa villages in the 
United Republic of Tanzania or newly defined political 
and administrative capitals {e.g.. Brazil, Nigeria. 
Pakistan and the United Republic of Tanzania); to 
settle sensitive political borders (Chile/Argentina, 
Brazilian interior borders etc.), or to facilitate the con-
struction of large-scale territorial economic complexes 
1Soviet Union). 
As a rule, few arguments arc raised against such 
" facilitating normative" policies to influence the ter-
ritorial distribution of population as long as the wider 
societal objectives are broadly accepted. Such large-
scale objectives concerning major national transfor-
mations are actively pursued usually only in countries 
with a high degree of nationalistic and/or ideologi-
cal mobilization and with a highly centralized decision-
making system. Therefore, political arguments against 
them and against facilitating normative govern-
ment intervention to influence territorial popula-
tion distribution also have a low probability of ar-
ticulation. There is no doubt. however. that from the 
point of view of the freedom of the individual substan-
tial arguments would be levied ::igainst some of these 
interventions even if only indirect measures are used 
such as social pressure for migration . the option be-
tween changing location or losing the job etc . This 
aspect depends ro a great extent upon the priority a 
society places on :iggregate national or even supra-
national objectives as opposed to those of the individ-
ual , the family or the local community. 
Normative government intervention. however. can 
also have the objective of restricting possible disrup-
tive effects of social and economic functional change 
on the living conditions of territorially organized social 
groups . Such "restricting normative·· intervention 
would, for instance. be designed to reduce migratory 
flows caused by large-scale industrialization or urban-
ization and to divert them to secondary or tertiary 
growth centres in order to reduce interregional dis-
parities in income levels. to reduce environmental de-
terioration or to avoid social disintegration. 
With regard to this type of restrictive normative 
intervention, there exists a wide array of positive and 
negative arguments and a great divergence of theoreti-
cal and practical responses. Restrictive normative 
government intervention to influence territorial popu-
lation distribution occupies a special position as it 
often stands at the conflict juncture between objec-
tives of territorial communities and large-scale 
functional organizations. This conflict may become 
particularly acute if large-scale functional organi -
za11ons (e .g., multinational enterprises) bring about 
rerritorial disintegration through over-exploitarion of 
territorially available natural resources. the introduc-
tion of inappropriate technology. the release of regional 
labour. environmental deterioration etc. This contlicr 
,,1u.11ion i5 similar to that between efficiency and 
n,u,1y in economic5 . 
Some academic etTor1 has been made to show that 
:he,e different objectives. economic efficiency and re-
~11.1nal equity. actually are in harmony rather than in 
~ontlict with each other, at least in the medium or the 
\1oi: term. The automatic divergence-convergence 
"ndrome in spatial di5parities is a typical case in 
roinl. Some related theoretical questions are dealt 
"-llh in the following section. 
C. S O ME THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION TO JNFLGENCE 
TERRITORIAL POPULATION DISTRIBUTION 
Of the basic arguments against government imer-
vcntion to iruluence territorial population distnbution, 
1hose given below are levied mainly on theoretical 
grounds or in terms of the inconsistency of policy 
interventions: 
(a) Restriction of freedom of the individual in mo-
bility and in choice of residential and working loca-
tions: 
(b) Disturbance of an automatic equilibrium mech-
anism which, on its own, will bring about convergence 
between the spatial distribution of population and eco-
nomic oppor1unities: 
(c) Ineffectiveness of such interventions due to the 
great complexity of factors involved. These arguments 
apply in varying degrees to the types of government 
intervention mentioned in section A. 
Resrricrion of freedom of rhe individual 
The argument concerning restriction of freedom of 
the individual is based on the assumption that migra-
tion and changes in the spatial distribution of popula-
tion are (except for natural hazards) the freely made 
decisions of the individuals concerned . This assump-
tion is made particularly for market economies. It fur-
thermore accepts the neo-ciassicaJ economic assump-
tion of a population of unlimited potential mobility. 
[f one interprets migration and changes in the spatial 
distribution of population, however, as response (Often 
involuntary) to external factors, these assumptions 
appear in a different light. A considerable part of mi-
gration , particularly from less developed areas, may in 
fact not be freely made by the individuals concerned, 
but may be their only way to survive. It is also in-
creasingly doubtful whether the concentration of large 
numbers of population in a few huge metropolitan 
centres-both in developing and in industrialized 
countries-actually is the desire of the individuals 
concerned or rather the result of a lack of viable alter-
native. 
The policy that is called -adaptive" intervention in 
the foregoing discussion actually is a cushioning of 
individuals, households and enterprises against such 
external factors. "Restricting normative" intervention 
is actually the type of intervention that attempts to 
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counterbalance possible disruptive effects of such ex-
ternal factors and to re-establish the freedom of the 
individual not only to move but to retain his or her 
social. political. environmental and other preferences. 
ft acknowledges the fact that individual5 are not full y 
mobile and that wherever mobility has surpassed a 
cer1ain threshold. social. political and environmental 
disruption has been the consequence, apart from the 
social cost to the individual. 
As for other types of government intervention. such 
as "facilitating normative" intervention le.g .. for the 
development of a new national capital or the settle-
ment of resource frontiers ). the y must be evaluated 
from the point of view of the freedom of the individual 
and will depend upon the degree to which incenti ve or 
compulsory measures are applied. 
Such intervention. therefore, must be judged by the 
specific policy instrument employed, i.e .. to what ex-
tent it enhances the choice of oppor1unities of the 
individual (household, enterprise etc.). The question 
becomes more complex, however, if one allows for the 
fact that even incentive measures often may only in-
duce the individual to give in to such external pres-
sures of the market mechanism as deteriorating terms 
of trade of specific regions. 
Disrurbance of an automatic equilibrium 
mechanism 
There exists a vast literature on convergence but 
only a few relevant topics are discussed here. The 
basic assumption nur1ured by neo-classical economists 
is that spatial differences in welfare will, given suffi-
cient time, even out automatically through either of 
two major channels : (a) commodity flows and the en-
suing equilibrium trend in the terms of trade; or (b l 
spatial flows of the factors of production and the en-
suing spatial equilibrium in factor prices. Among the 
production factors is labour; therefore. some relevant 
theoretical hypotheses on migrational equilibrium are 
reviewed below in more detail. 
For migratory movements or equilibrium-oriented 
trends in the labour market, there are a number of 
basic assumptions . A key assumption is that labour 
will migrate to highly developed regions with scarce 
labour supply (and therefore high wages) from areas of 
excess labour (and therefore low wage levels). Such 
assumed individual welfare-maximizing behaviour is 
expected to reduce labour supply in low-wage regions 
and increase it in high-wage areas. thereby equalizing 
wage levels between regions and making further mi-
gration unnecessary. At this stage of equilibrium at 
least temporary optimal allocation of labour would be 
reached in the sense that both individual welfare and 
overall efficiency would be maximized. Any govern-
ment intervention 1except for possible transitory meas-
ures) would distor1 this equilibrium mechanism and 
lead to a non-optimal allocation of labour. 
The fact that , in reality, this equilibrium mechanism 
does not materialize in most countries has provoked a 
great number of complementary explanations . Only 
the most crucial explanations are given here and are 
related to possible corrective measures which in many 
countries have been utilized in attempts lo induce the 
equilibrium mechanism to operate . 
In.sufficient m obility of labour 
Insufficient mobility of labour and other production 
factors were an explanation given for the malfunc-
tioni ng of the equilibrium mechanism. Therefore. 
policies to increase the mobility of labour, capital and 
technology and to reduce barriers to their migration 
were implemented in many countries to improve the 
fun;:tioning of the equilibrium mechanism. Still, spatial 
disparities in levels of living have persisted and in 
many cases even further increased.• Migration pro-
pensities have also continued to increase, as have their 
disruptive social. politic:u and environmental effects. 
lt has also been demonstrated theoretically that 
even with full transport integration a polynucleated 
settlement system will never reach spatial equality in 
welfare through individual optimizing behaviour. 7 
Qualitarive selectivity of the migration process 
Another explanation given is that the migratory pro-
cesses between high-wage and low-wage regions have 
a negative selectivity bias against the lauer in the sense 
that out-migration from less developed areas consists 
mainly of the more qualified and therefore more pro-
ductive population strata. Thus, while labour supply in 
less developed areas decreases, productivity de-
creases even more and therefore average wages do not 
rise-as theoretically assumed-but decline even 
funher. On the other hand, in highly developed areas 
labour productivity increases relatively; and, as a con-
sequence, wage levels do not decline substantially. 
The relatively high productivity of in-migrants in-
creases the productivity of capital and land there and 
thereby reduces the propensity of other factors to 
move into less developed areas . The system therefore 
continues mov ing away from equilibrium. A few 
countries, such as Canada, have attempted to reduce 
this negative selectivity of migration through incen-
tives for the moving of entire families (including the 
aged and other dependent family members) but it ap-
pears that results have not been of great significance. 
Unequal distribution of infrastructure, public services 
and scale economies 
Another explanation for the malfunctioning of the 
equilibrium mechanism is the unequal spatial distribu-
tion of scale and external economies caused by infra-
structure investment, public services and urban ag-
glomerations. In many countries, therefore, ao attempt 
• [bid. 
' 'i\. u.liam Alonso. • Income inequalities among region• in the Ions 
,un--a theoretical note". paper submitted to the International lnsti-
:utc of Applied Sysrem, Analysis , Luenburg, Austria, 1978. 
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has been made to reduce this bias by allocating man 
public investment to less developed areas. Because 
of the hierarchical characteristics of central-place 
facilities 8 and of sophisticated infrastructure systems, 
complete equality of accessibility to such facilities is 
both practically and theoretically impossible in a poly-
nucleated settlement system. lt has recenrly been 
shown,• however, that under conditions of dif-
ferentiated scale economies even a perfect price sys-
tem will lead to a suboptimal allocation of resources. 
Therefore, in contrast to a widely held view. both 
diminishing returns and increasing returns in the social 
production set can be "incompatible with the achieve-
ment of optimality via competitive prices (or any other 
parametric prices, for that matterr . 10 
Indefinite time lag in a possible interregional 
equilibrium 
It has been shown" empirically that spatial dis-
parities tend to follow an inverted U-curve in the pro-
cess of national development, increasing in early 
stages of national development ( initial industrial-
ization); and, after passing a peak. declining again in 
later (post-industrial) phases of national development. 
This empirically noted phenomenon has been attrib-
uted speculatively to . various factors, including 
changes in the composition of economic sectors (se-
quential emphasis on the primary, secondary. and ter-
tiary sectors and their respective locational patterns) 
and varying degrees of spatial concentration of exter-
nal and scale economies in different periods of national 
development. 12 Apart from the fact that this observed 
divergence-convergence sequence in the evolution of 
spatial disparities need not necessarily be reproduced 
in the future, its time dimension is indeterminate and 
may be intolerably long in rectifying inequities-from 
a social and political point of view-for most develop-
ing countries, which have the highest spatial dis-
parities in levels of living and the greatest propensity 
towards migratory concentration. 
Indefinite rime lag in a possible interurban equilibrium 
A similar inverted U-curve is postulated by EI-
Shakhs 'J to hold for urban primacy, i.e., the predomi-
• Martin J. Beckman, ·ctiancenverteiluns in einem zentral-
iin tichen System" (Distribution of opportunities in a central place 
system) . paper presented at the August-Liisch-Tage , He,denhcim. 
September 1978 (mimeographed) . 
'WiUiam J. Baumol, "Quasi optimality: the price we must pay for 
a price system". paper submllted to the lnsutute for Advanced 
Studies, Vienna. 1979. rFonhcoming in Journal of Political Econ-
omy .) 
•• Ibid .• p. 3. 
"J . G. Williamson. "Regional inequality and the process of na-
tional development: a description of the pauems". Economic Devef-
opmuit and Cultural Change. vol. 13. No . 4. part II !July !965), pp . 
1-84. 
'
1 W . B. SrOhr, lnrtr•urban Systems and R~gional Economrc DI! • 
velopment , Resource Paper Series, No. 26 (Washington, D.C .. As-
sociation of American Geographc~. 1974) . 
"Salah S. El-Sha.J<l,s. "Development, primacy and systems of 
cities•. Journal of Developing Areas, vol. 7. No. I (October 1972), 
pp. 11-36. 
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nance of one or a few large cities over the rest of the 
urban system. He finds that urban primacy increased 
at early stages of national development and then began 
to decrease at later stages, approaching an equilibrium 
in which the population of each city ( P.) compared 
with the largest city in the country (Pt) would ap-
proach the inverse of its rank (R.) in the urban hierar-
p 
chy (P. = ~ ) and tend to follow a so--<:alled "log-
R. 
normal curve··." Such a log-normal city-size distribu-
tion presumably represents an optimal equilibrium aJ. 
location of central pl ace facilities. 1 i 
The same uncertainties aJready mentioned in con-
nection with a possible automatic interregional con-
vergence apply in this case . In addition. the equilib-
rium rank-size rule for the urban system is non- spatial. 
That is, it considers only the relative size distribution 
of cities but not their geographical distribution over a 
territory, which means that even if the size distribution 
should correspond to the rank-size rule. all the larger 
cities may be located in only one region of a country , 
while the other regions may be deprived of larger and 
even intermediate -sized cities . It is clear that this situ-
ation would not facilitate migrational equilibrium. 
quite apart from the restrictions with respect to dif-
ferential scale economies 16 discussed above. 
It should be further stated that the foregoing 
arguments operate not only separately but in a 
cumulative way 17 which means that even if one or 
some of these disequilibrating factors did not exist or 
could be eliminated-thereby strengthening the 
arguments against government intervention in the 
equilibrium mechanism-the presence of even one of 
these factors would cumulatively cause the others to 
also work against equilibrium. Thus, differential ac-
cess to external and scale economies will lead to a 
negatively selective migratory process, which will in-
crease interregional disparities . Conversely. inter-
regional disparities will reinforce interurban dis-
parities, which will widen the differentiation in access 
to scale and external economies and thereby reinforce 
negative selectivity of the migratory process. 
In fact, the only conditions under which automatic 
convergence towards equilibrium would occur-and 
thereby fully justify the theoretical arguments against 
government intervention-would be if either full mo-
bility of population, production factors and com-
modities could be reached or if the total spatial system 
could be reduced to a point location II as neo-classical 
economists at first assumed. It happens that both these 
conditions are unfeasible and undesirable in practice . 
,. Brian J. L. Berry and Frank E. Horton, eds., Geograpliic 
Pasp,ctiv,:i on Urban Sysrtms: With /111,graud Rtadings (En-
'1•wood Cliff,, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 64 . 
"~artin J. Becl<.mann, Locatiorr Th,ory (New York. Random 
House, 1968). 
"See W. J. Baumol, op. c1t. 
" :\s shown in Gunnar MyrdaJ, Economic Theory and Under· 
d,v,ioptd Regions (London. G. Duckworth and Co .. 1957. 
' ' Horst Siebert. R,giona/ EcoMmic Growrh: Thtory and Policy 
,Scranton. Pennsylvania, ln1crna1ional Textbook Company. 1969). 
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Both would be the cause of strong external dis-
economies (full mobility because of the need for al-
most ubiquitous infrastructure, fully concentrated 
societies for their high agglomeration diseconomies), 
of strong social disruption (through excessive mobility 
or excessive density) and of environmental disruption 
(through lack of territorial identification or through the 
over-utilization of land and natural resources) . 
This, with given initial disparities in levels of living 
and only one disequilibrating factor present, large-
scale functional integration and increased mobility o f 
factors and/or commodities will inevitably lead to in-
creasing disparities and require massive governmental 
intervention in territorial population distribution un-
less equity considerations are widely employed. Gov-
ernment intervention is necessary to compensate for 
the emerging spread and backwash effects 19 or polari-
zation and trickling-down effects. 10 or to help popula-
tion to redistribute so as to take account of them. 
One condition in which government intervention to 
influence territorial population distribution would not 
be required would therefore be if its role were taken 
over by an economic policy that would effectively 
compensate for spread and backwash effects in order 
to reduce spatial disparities in welfare and thereby 
eliminate a major reason for mi&ration and " spontane-
ous" redistribution of population. This question tran-
scends the scope of the present paper and it is only 
indicated here that scarcely any successful policies to 
reduce major spatial disparities in welfare have thus 
far been developed for market and mixed economies. ' 1 
An alrernative : a policy of selective spatial closure 
A second condition under which no major govern-
ment intervention to influence the territorial distribu-
tion of population would be necessary is one in which 
the emergence of these withdrawal effects is avoided 
by what has been called a policy of "selective spatial 
closure". 21 Such an alternative policy of "selective 
spatial closure", particularly for least developed pe-
ripheral areas, 13 would replace the current emphasis 
on large-scale functional integration and the unbal-
anced exploiting of territorially available resources" 
including migration. Such a policy would instead be 
" G. MyrdaJ. op. cit. 
1
• Albert 0. Hirschman. Th, S1rau11y oi Economic D,v,iopmenr 
1:--iew Haven. Connecticm. Yale University Press, 1958). 
" Walter B. 510hr and F. Tod!li ng, - Evaluation of regional 
policies: e xperience in market and mixed ~conomies~. in Niles .\if. 
Hansen~ ed .. Human s~ulemenr Sysums: ln terna1,una/ Perspe c-
tives on 5Jructure. Change. and Public Policy , C:unbndge, Massa• 
chusetts, Ballinger, 1978). 
" W. B. Stohr and F. Todlling, -spatial equity-some an1i1hese, 
10 cu~nt regional development docinnc" . 
" Walter B. Stohr.· Development from below: the botlom-up and 
periphery-inward development par.><:hgm··. in Walter 8. Stohr and 
D. R. F. Taylor, eds ., D,veiopm,111 from Abov, or Below .' A Crir-
1co/ R,appro,sa/ oi Spatio/ Plannrng in D,v,ioping Countrin (Lon-
don. Wiley, fonhcoming/ . 
:, Niles M. Hansen . ·Oeveiopm~nt from above: the centre~ 
down-and-outward development paradigm·, in Walter 8. Stohr and 
D. R. F. Taylor , eds .. op. ci1. 
geared towards the maximum mobilization and temto-
rial integration of available natural. human and institu-
tional resources for endogenously motivated and more 
self-reliant development. 
As major changes in population distribution are 
triggered mainly by large-scale functional integration. 
such a policy of selective spatial closure would sub-
stantially reduce the need for government interven-
tion. Territoria lly organized population groups would 
give priority to the collective self-reliance on territo-
rially available resources for the satisfaction of their 
needs at local :i nd successive regional. national and 
multinational levels . Therefore. territorially organized 
governance systems need to be reinforced and put to 
u se as a counterbalancing power against the with-
d.:-awaJ effects of large-scale functional integration 
<!it her by t multiregional) firms or by I multiregionaJ) 
government. Suc h development "from below"~ 5 would 
be similar to the path followed by countries tha t were 
able to structure an aniculated urban system and ter-
ritorial governance mechanisms before large-scale 
functional integration at the national and international 
s.::ale had taken place and were therefore much better 
able to retain such territorially organized structures in 
the face of large-scale funct ional inregration. The more 
recently developing count ries might need to retain or 
regain sufficient c:ontrol over e;(!emal influences to 
develop these territorially organized structures ac -
cording to their own societal objectives. 
D. MIGRATION POLICY AND GOYERNMENTINTERYEN-
TI ON TO INFL UENCE TERRITORIAL POPULATION 
DISTRIBUTION IN SOME Eli ROPEAN COUNTRIES 26 
A. striking illu stration of the effects of insufficient 
economic redistribution policies and the practical lack 
of government intervention 10 influence territorial 
population distribution is the problems of both the less 
developed and the industrialized countries of Europe 
resulting from the !lacking) migration and distribution 
policy followed by the European members of the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment 1OECD) during the past two decades. 
The underlying philosophy was one of freedom of 
the individual and .. liberalisation of manpower move-
ment' ' " in order to permit the maximum possible 
growth for the members of OECD as a whole. Up to 
the end of the l 960s , the OECD report states , labour 
migration resulted from a coincidence of needs : excess 
labour demand in one group of the European countrie s 
combined with excess labour supply in the other 
group. The manpower agreements that were con-
cluded were. a t best, .. adaptive" government interven-
tion to ameliorate the consequences of overall OECD 
'-' W. B. Sto hr . ··~velopmenc from below: the bottom-up and 
periphery-inward develo pment parag,f!111-
=• This section draws extens ively on Organrsauon for Economic 
Co--0perauon 3.nd Development, .Higranon, Gro",th und Dt\·tlop~ 
m att , Pans . 1979). 
, - Ibid . . p. 9. 
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growth objectives for individual countries or popula-
tion groups . The report states that the primary concern 
of the manpower agreements of the pas! was to supply 
manpower to the highly developed immigration coun-
tries . II further assens that from the point of view of 
the labour-importing countries. the availability of mi-
grant labour, like a "reserve army of unemployed" . 
e.~erts a downward pressure on wages and prices, 
which allows a surplus from lower cost output. Labour 
migration in post-war Europe has been determined 
strictly from the demand side: the supply of labour was 
well in excess of demand in the receivinl! countries: 
therefore, wages remained relatively lo~ in those 
countries , even though output was expanding rapidly . 
Thus , the report concludes. the proceeds from in-
creased output were channelled into profits or into 
returns to capital. which ensured the .. positive feed-
back'' needed for rhe continuation of the process . 
From the standpoint of the less developed countrie s 
that ··expon" migrants , the remittances of their mi-
grants working abroad provide foreign exchange to 
finance capital imponation and thus economic devel-
opment. .. Human capital is thus exported with the 
hope that it will finance the importation of physical 
capital at a later date."'8 The OECD report funher 
states that this hope is. of course. a longer term con-
sideration. 
The report takes note that the analyrical work of 
OECD hi storically appears to have been more con-
cerned with growth and price stability in the highly 
developed countries of the area than with the devel-
opment problems of the developing economies . possi-
bly on the "assumption that high rates of economic 
growrh a mong the more advanced countries would 
ultimately · trickle down· to the less ad vanced coun-
tries" .19 
In the early 1970s, however, before the longer term 
consideration could materialize and lead to the auto-
matic convergence of welfare levels predicted by neo-
classical economists , the labour markets began to de-
teriorate ; and around 1973 , the industrialized Euro-
pean countries unilaterally decided to restrict the 
further inflow of foreign labour. The OECD report 
gives two ostensible reasons for the imposition o f the 
restrictions: (a) the decline of economic benefits fro m 
continued importation of foreign labour due to lagging 
world demand for oulput; and lb) the perceived rising 
social costs of accommodating and integrating in-
creasing proportions of foreigners during a period of 
growing relative scarcity. Furthermore, social tensions 
were occasionally manifested, particularly in urba n 
areas containing large concenrrations of foreigners 
who. according to the report, had begun to acquire 
tastes more like those of the nationals of the country 
and who claimed a larger share of such public services 
as schools, medical sen•ices and housing. 
ft was then recognized that migration con sis ts o f 
" Ibid . . p. c8. 
" Ibid .. p. 44 . 
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more than the movement of factors of production . As 
the OECD report points out. migration is the move -
ment of people; as such. it has an essential social 
component. The process gives rise _to social costs for 
the populations of both the sending and receiving 
countries. costs borne not only by the migrants and 
their employers. Migration implies a mixing of cul-
tures. which can on occasion lead to senous social 
tensions. Furthermore. the increasing demands on 
public goods and services reduce the net economic 
benefits accruing to the host country." Social tensions 
can completely reverse net economic profits and turn 
them into net social losses ... io 
These human and social problems have, of course. 
existed throughout the period of rapidly increasing 
migration and of large-scale redistribution of labour 
and population; buc they were masked by the general 
growth euphoria and by a concomitant neglect of the 
anxieties of the perso ns facilitating that growth. More 
systematic and deliberate reactions occurred only 
when overall growth slackened :i.nd the structural 
weaknesses created by growth became visible. 
In order to cope with these problems. the OECD 
report suggests that from an international standpoint. 
the most pressing priority is to have a policy whereby 
assistance would be given to the less developed coun-
tries. so as to redistribute their current unemployment 
burden---:aused by the return of their nationals who 
had been working abroad-more equitably. The report 
cakes note that although migration was at first found to 
be a useful factor in post-war European growth. it is 
now recognized merely to manifest unequal interna-
tional development; such unrestricted migration "is 
not and should not be considered a key" to the long-
term development problems of the countries sending 
migrants . Concerning migration , the report continues 
that "as a causal factor in the relief of employment 
problems it is but marginal in the longer term"." 
A number of options are recommended by the 
OECD report for the equitable redistribution of the 
burdens created by restrictions on labour flows: 
(a) Tax/transfer schemes in favour of less devel-
oped countries: 
JO Ibid. , p. }0. 
" Ibid .. p. 36. 
(b) Compensation by investmenr; 
le) Loans or grants to stimulate the growrh 
labour-intensive activities in the less developed r 
gions covered by OECD: 
<J) Institution of "migratory chains .. intended 
utilize the various emigration phases-from the wod 
er's departure and during his sray in the host countr 
until his return and reintegration into the socio 
economic life of his own country-for the "optimun 
benefit of the country of emigrat ion and the worke 
himself'.12 
With respect to the migratory chain. the report ac-
knowledges. more realistically. that although its :id-
vantages are evident. its implementation would be dif-
ficult. Furthermore. when effect ively implemented. 
although such a chain might accelerate development 
by fostering a greater !low of remiHances and helping 
to increase employment. thereby speeding the return 
of migrant workers. it would be ··an extension of emi-
gration rather than an alternative to it". 33 
It is clear that many of the problems mentioned 
could have been a voided had such measures in favour 
of the less developed regions been taken before large-
scale migration and population redistribution ad-
vanced to the current stage. The measures for gov-
ernment intervention to influence territorial population 
distribution suggested here can only attempt to salvage 
whatever is possible. 
The OECD report on the situation in Europe has 
been drawn on extensively not because it can be of 
direct use in other major areas of the world. in par-
ticular the less developed regions. Rather. the conten-
tion is that this information can help other regions that 
have not vet reached such a high degree of large-scale 
functionai integration to avoid similar pitfalls. either 
by searching for more effective policies to reduce s pa-
tial inequalities of levels of living as the major cause of 
" sponianeous" large-scale population redistribution or 
by examining more closely the consequences of a pol-
icy of ··selective spatial closure·· . as su ggested e lse-
where.'• 
"Ibid . . p. -10. 
" /hid .. p. 40. 
,. W. Stohr and F. Tii<ltling, -spacial equ,cy-some anllthcses 10 
currtnr regional development doctnne .. . 
